Researchers from Nanyang Technological University reveal widespread vulnerabilities
A recent academic study exposes 84 security flaws in 4G and 5G core networks that could lead to denial‑of‑service attacks and allow attackers to hijack user sessions.
A new academic investigation has uncovered 84 security vulnerabilities in the core components of 4G and 5G mobile networks. The study, conducted by researchers at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, describes a broad class of flaws that could be leveraged to disrupt service or take control of user sessions.
4G and 5G core networks form the backbone of mobile communications, handling tasks such as authentication, session management, and routing of user traffic. They are critical for ensuring that devices can connect reliably and securely to the wider internet.
The researchers identified 84 distinct weaknesses, many of which stem from improper handling of control‑plane messages. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by malformed packets that are sent from a compromised device or an attacker’s infrastructure.
One of the most alarming findings is a session‑hijacking flaw. By sending a crafted sequence of messages, an attacker can cause the network to believe a legitimate user’s session is still active, effectively allowing the attacker to impersonate that user and gain access to the user’s data streams.
In addition to hijacking, the same flaw set can be used to launch denial‑of‑service (DoS) attacks. By flooding the core with malformed requests, an operator can exhaust processing resources, leading to degraded service or complete outages for affected users.
Researchers explain that the vulnerability class is rooted in the way core network functions validate and authenticate control‑plane traffic. When validation is bypassed, attackers can inject or modify messages that the network accepts as legitimate.
A sample exploit involves an attacker sending a forged session‑establishment request that the core accepts, thereby creating a new session that the attacker can control. The attacker can then redirect traffic, eavesdrop, or terminate legitimate sessions.
For mobile network operators, the implications are significant. The presence of these flaws means that existing security hardening measures may need to be revisited, and that operators should prioritize patching of core network software.
Researchers recommend that operators:
Looking forward, the study underscores the need for continuous security assessment of core network components as 5G deployments expand. Operators and vendors alike should treat these findings as a call to action, ensuring that the backbone of mobile communications remains resilient against evolving threats.
A new academic investigation has uncovered 84 security vulnerabilities in the core components of 4G and 5G mobile networks. The study, conducted by researchers at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, describes a broad class of flaws that could be leveraged to disrupt service or take control of user sessions.
4G and 5G core networks form the backbone of mobile communications, handling tasks such as authentication, session management, and routing of user traffic. They are critical for ensuring that devices can connect reliably and securely to the wider internet.
The researchers identified 84 distinct weaknesses, many of which stem from improper handling of control‑plane messages. These vulnerabilities can be triggered by malformed packets that are sent from a compromised device or an attacker’s infrastructure.
One of the most alarming findings is a session‑hijacking flaw. By sending a crafted sequence of messages, an attacker can cause the network to believe a legitimate user’s session is still active, effectively allowing the attacker to impersonate that user and gain access to the user’s data streams.
In addition to hijacking, the same flaw set can be used to launch denial‑of‑service (DoS) attacks. By flooding the core with malformed requests, an operator can exhaust processing resources, leading to degraded service or complete outages for affected users.
Researchers explain that the vulnerability class is rooted in the way core network functions validate and authenticate control‑plane traffic. When validation is bypassed, attackers can inject or modify messages that the network accepts as legitimate.
A sample exploit involves an attacker sending a forged session‑establishment request that the core accepts, thereby creating a new session that the attacker can control. The attacker can then redirect traffic, eavesdrop, or terminate legitimate sessions.
For mobile network operators, the implications are significant. The presence of these flaws means that existing security hardening measures may need to be revisited, and that operators should prioritize patching of core network software.
Researchers recommend that operators: conduct a comprehensive audit of control‑plane message handling, apply vendor‑issued patches promptly, and implement stricter validation for session‑establishment requests.
Looking forward, the study underscores the need for continuous security assessment of core network components as 5G deployments expand. Operators and vendors alike should treat these findings as a call to action, ensuring that the backbone of mobile communications remains resilient against evolving threats.